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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: HOW REVIEW OF 
NATURAL GAS EXPORTS HIDES ENVIRONMENTAL 
EFFECTS IN PLAIN SIGHT 
Julia Michel* 
Abstract 
Often called the “Magna Carta” of environmental laws, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has made informed 
decision-making about the environment a pre-requisite for 
every major federal permit approval. By requiring federal 
agencies to systematically consider and disclose the 
environmental and health consequences of a course of action, 
NEPA also made federal decision-making public—”we know 
best” no longer suffices to allow agencies to make a decision 
without considering its environmental consequences. Yet 
NEPA’s mandate has been thwarted when it comes to natural 
gas exports. Without meaningful review of the consequences, 
federal agencies have already approved proposals to export an 
amount roughly equivalent to one-fifth of all domestic natural 
gas demand.  In so doing, they have failed to consider basic 
consequences such as rising domestic prices, production, and 
pollution. This Note argues that recent decisions by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have allowed federal 
agencies to hide the impacts of natural gas exports in an 
improperly segmented review process. Because the public and 
local decision-makers deserve—and NEPA requires—an 
honest assessment of the impacts associated with natural gas 
exports, this Note urges judges and advocates to consider 
segmentation as a critical legal principle for understanding 
why the D.C. Circuit’s recent decisions have created a void in 
environmental review and should be reconsidered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Due in large part to the development of hydraulic fracturing 
(“fracking”) drilling techniques,1 U.S. production and use of 
natural gas has swelled over the last decade. The increased 
availability of cheap domestic natural gas has reduced the 
demand for imported gas, prompting owners of natural gas 
import terminals to reconfigure their facilities to export gas to 
international markets.2 
If natural gas exports continue to rise,3 so too will increased 
domestic natural gas production and its associated 
environmental impacts. Studies have consistently 
                                                 
   * Juris Doctor, University of Washington School of Law. I am thankful for the 
insight and guidance of my advisor, Professor Sanne Knudsen, and the editing by 
Devin Kesner and the WJELP editorial staff.  
1. See 80 Fed. Reg. 18,557, 18,559 (Apr. 7, 2015) (noting that as a result of these 
developments the United States’ natural gas production has reached its highest level 
in 30 years). 
2. Id. 
3. U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 29, 
2017), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/importsexports/annual/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GA-
QPZ8] (indicating that natural gas exports in 2016 were more than triple the level in 
2006). 
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demonstrated that sixty to seventy percent of the exported gas 
will be from new domestic gas production; that increased 
exports raise domestic natural gas prices; and that as natural 
gas prices increase, the electric power sector will shift back to 
coal-fired generation.4 Despite the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires all federal agencies to 
conduct a meaningful review of the environmental effects of 
proposed projects,5 the effects of natural gas exports remain 
hidden in a “tangled web” of regulation.6 
Operators of a natural gas terminal seeking to construct or 
reconfigure facilities for export must obtain authorization from 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and also 
seek a permit to export the gas from the Department of Energy 
(DOE or the Department).7 While each permit triggers 
environmental review under NEPA,8 neither agency fully 
considers environmental impacts as a pre-requisite for 
authorizing natural gas exports. 
Environmental groups have mounted litigation to pin down 
where the responsibility for a sensible and more 
comprehensive environmental review lies. To date, they have 
failed.9 Rejecting the first wave of challenges to FERC 
approvals for the construction and operation of export 
facilities, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that DOE’s 
separate authorization for exporting the gas “absolves” FERC 
of its responsibility to assess the indirect effects of approving 
                                                 
4. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS 
EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 6 (2012), 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MA-7VYX]. 
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
6. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Freeport I), 827 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012); MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42074, 
U.S. NATURAL GAS EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 14 (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42074.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6Q7-F5JS]. 
8. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). Environmental reviews are not 
required for actions covered by a “categorical exclusion,” or when an agency makes a 
“finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2017). 
9. The challenges were to FERC’s approval of Dominion Resources Inc.’s Cove Point 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Maryland (“Cove Point”), EarthReports, Inc. v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (EarthReports), 828 F.3d 949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2016); 
Cheniere Energy Inc.’s Sabine Pass LNG project in Louisiana, Sierra Club v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Sabine), 827 F.3d 59, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 2016); and the 
Freeport LNG project in Texas, Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 40. 
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export facilities.10 Parallel challenges to DOE’s environmental 
review fared no better.11 The result is that neither the agencies 
nor the public clearly understand the environmental impacts 
of each liquefied natural gas (LNG)12 export terminal. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decisions raise a fundamental question: 
have DOE and FERC improperly evaded disclosure of the 
environmental impacts of authorizing LNG exports? Setting 
aside the question of whether FERC and DOE reviews reflect 
an inappropriate bias toward approval of LNG permits, this 
Note argues that the two agencies have thwarted NEPA’s 
requirement that agencies take a “hard look” at the 
environmental effects of proposed actions before approval.13 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the 
Natural Gas Act and gives a brief overview of how the parallel 
FERC and DOE processes operate. The section also describes 
the NEPA framework, its purpose, and how courts have 
applied its various timing and scoping requirements to ensure 
that agencies provide a detailed review of a project’s 
environmental effects. 
Part II explains how NEPA and the Natural Gas Act operate 
in action. Using the recent Freeport LNG terminal and 
associated litigation as an example, this section walks through 
the D.C. Circuit’s emerging framework for evaluating NEPA 
challenges to natural gas export authorizations. Part II also 
explores why the D.C. Circuit’s framework leaves an 
unacceptable void in environmental review. 
                                                 
10. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 48; see also EarthReports, 828 F.3d at 956; Sabine, 827 
F.3d at 68. 
11. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Freeport II), 867 F.3d 189, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 
2017). 
12. More than 600 times more condensed than its vapor form, LNG is stored and 
transported more easily, and is thus suitable for exporting. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
DOE/FE-0849, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: UNDERSTANDING THE BASIC FACTS 3 (2005), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/LNG_primerupd.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MVN-YWM9] (explaining that LNG is natural gas cooled to the 
temperature at which the vapor liquefies and stating that natural gas vaporizes at 
-260°F/-162°C). 
13. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to include a discussion of “the 
environmental impact of the proposed action” and “any adverse environmental effects 
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented” in their NEPA 
analyses). 
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Part III identifies problems with the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning. Specifically, the court appears to misconstrue a 
Supreme Court case, Department of Transportation v. Public 
Citizen,14 as a blank check for FERC to evade a complete 
environmental review of impacts associated with export-
induced natural gas production. Additionally, the court has 
failed to explain why DOE’s generalized assessment of 
environmental impacts—untethered from the specific export 
proposal under review—nonetheless satisfies NEPA’s 
requirement for a “hard look” review. 
Finally, Part IV examines areas for potential future 
challenges by returning to a familiar doctrine in NEPA case 
law: the prohibition on “illegally segmenting projects in order 
to avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on the 
environment[.]”15 Applying NEPA’s anti-segmentation 
principles to the current two-step review of LNG export 
facilities could force the respective agencies to unify their 
review and provide the public with the honest assessment it 
deserves. 
I. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS DO 
NOT SUPPORT INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL 
REVIEW 
The statutory frameworks governing natural gas exports—
namely NEPA16 and the Natural Gas Act17—do not, on their 
face, support incomplete environmental reviews of natural gas 
exports. Rather, NEPA’s information-forcing regime should 
inform FERC and DOE’s substantive decisions.18 Therefore, 
understanding how the two statutory schemes operate in 
tandem is a prerequisite to understanding the degree to which 
the D.C. Circuit has allowed FERC and DOE to evade their 
responsibilities to analyze and disclose significant 
                                                 
14. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 
15. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012). 
18. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 347; see also 40 C.F.R. § 5001.1(c) (2017) (“The NEPA 
process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on 
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, 
and enhance the environment.”). 
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environmental impacts of projects they approve. Ultimately, 
allowing such serious deficiencies in the NEPA review runs the 
risk of infecting the agencies’ substantive public interest 
determinations in an arbitrary and capricious review. Stated 
otherwise, the failure to identify or characterize the 
incremental environmental impacts of LNG exports 
undermines any conclusion that these impacts would be 
outweighed by the benefits. 
A. The Natural Gas Act 
The Natural Gas Act grants FERC the authority to approve 
the siting, construction, expansion, and operation of an LNG 
export terminal unless it finds that approval would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.19 FERC has stated that 
the Natural Gas Act “sets out a general presumption favoring. 
. .authorization” for applications to modify natural gas 
terminals.20 FERC has also taken the position that public 
interest review is limited to the economic and environmental 
impacts of “the proposal before us,” i.e., limited to the impacts 
associated with the facilities used to allow exports, but not the 
impacts of the exports themselves.21 
FERC has defended its view that only the direct 
environmental impacts of a facility matter for its public 
interest determination in a round-about way. Specifically, it 
has stated that its regulatory functions vis-à-vis LNG export 
facilities were transferred to the Secretary of Energy in 1977 
in the Department of Energy Organization Act;22 that the 
Secretary subsequently delegated back to FERC the authority 
to approve or disapprove the construction and operation of 
particular facilities;23 but that the Secretary’s delegation of 
                                                 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (“The 
Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for 
the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG [liquefied natural gas] 
terminal.”);  RATNER ET AL., supra note  7, at 14. 
20. Respondent’s Opening Brief at 6, Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2015) 
(No. 14-1275) (citing Va. Pub. Servs. Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 681 F.2d 847, 856 
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
21. See Order Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 
Freeport LNG Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 9–10 (July 30, 2014). 
22. Id. at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b)). 
23. Id. (citing DOE Delegation Order No. 00-044.00A). 
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authority does not permit FERC to consider the indirect 
environmental impacts of a particular facility.24 
Courts have neither blessed FERC’s interpretations of the 
DOE delegation order nor outlined the precise scope of FERC’s 
actual authority under the delegation.25 The answers to these 
questions may have important implications in future cases. 
Nevertheless, even if FERC need only consider the 
environmental impacts directly surrounding a proposed facility 
for purposes of its Natural Gas Act-mandated public interest 
determination, its environmental review mandated by NEPA 
would still need to discuss anticipated environmental impacts 
occurring further afield.26 After all, neither the Natural Gas 
Act nor DOE’s delegation order purports to override NEPA’s 
independent requirement that agencies document the indirect 
impacts of a proposal.27 
In any event, in addition to securing FERC’s approval for 
the construction and operation of the export facility, parties 
seeking to export natural gas also file for an export 
authorization under the rules and procedures established by 
DOE.28 Proposals to export gas to a “free trade” nation receive 
automatic authorization from DOE.29 In other words, in some 
instances, the only review standing between a proposal to 
build LNG export facilities and international markets is 
FERC’s public interest assessment.30 Before granting 
                                                 
24. See id. at 8–10. FERC subsequently re-characterized its decision to decline 
consideration of indirect effects, defending its decision on the grounds that the 
potential environmental effects were not sufficiently causally related to the project 
under review. Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG 
Development, L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
25. See Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 45 (expressly not deciding the “propriety or scope of 
the Commission’s delegated authority under the Natural Gas Act”). 
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017). NEPA will be 
covered in more detail in Section II.B. 
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). DOE regulations implementing those requirements 
were promulgated at 10 C.F.R. pt. 590 (2017), “Administrative Procedures with 
Respect to the Import and Export of Natural Gas.” While section 717b(a) appears to 
require FERC’s approval for the export of natural gas, this function was transferred to 
the Secretary of Energy in 1977 pursuant to section 301(b) of the Department of 
Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (2012). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012). 
30. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 40; see also Answering Brief for Respondent at 5, Freeport 
II, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2016) (No. 15-1489). 
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applications to export gas to a country with which the United 
States has no free trade agreement, however, DOE must 
independently determine whether such exports would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.31 
DOE recognizes that its public interest review requires an 
assessment of environmental impacts32 but has taken the 
position that the Natural Gas Act does not impose 
environmental review obligations greater than those already 
required under NEPA.33 Nevertheless, the relevance of 
environmental impacts to DOE’s public interest review 
indicates how much DOE relies on an honest, comprehensive 
NEPA analysis to inform its substantive public interest 
determination.34 In other words, deficiencies in DOE’s 
environmental review required by NEPA run the risk of 
infecting its substantive public interest determinations; 
presumably, without characterizing or evaluating the severity 
of environmental impacts, DOE would have no basis for 
concluding that the exports’ benefits are outweighed by 
environmental harms. 
DOE and FERC’s responsibilities to chronicle environmental 
impacts are not just implicit in the Natural Gas Act’s public 
interest determinations. The Act explicitly establishes a 
protocol to ensure compliance with environmental reviews 
required by NEPA by designating FERC as “the lead agency 
for the purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal 
authorizations and for the purposes of complying with 
[NEPA].”35 The D.C. Circuit has interpreted this to mean that, 
for purposes of FERC’s environmental reviews, DOE 
participates as a “cooperating agency.”36 Then, DOE may adopt 
                                                 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). 
32. See Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 60 (noting DOE’s duty is 
to identify and evaluate the factors relevant to the public interest, specifically listing 
environmental factors); see also id. at 36 (noting DOE considered a study estimating 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions across all proposed exports, but not the specific 
facility at issue). 
33. Id. at 60. 
34. In fact, DOE regulations specifically enlist the applicants themselves in the 
environmental review process, requiring export applications to include the potential 
environmental impacts of the project. 10 C.F.R. § 590.202(b)(7) (2017). 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
36. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 41–
42 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). 
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FERC’s environmental analysis as its own for purposes of the 
NEPA review triggered by an export-authorization request, 
provided that DOE “independently review[s]” FERC’s work 
and concludes that DOE’s own “comments and suggestions 
have been satisfied.”37 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Often called the “Magna Carta”38 of environmental laws, 
NEPA creates an information-forcing regime to serve “twin 
aims”: (1) to ensure that all federal agencies have considered 
every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a 
proposed action; and (2) to guarantee that the public is made 
aware of the consequences of an agency’s decisions, enabling 
interested persons to participate in deciding what projects 
agencies should approve and under what terms.39 With NEPA, 
the hope was that agencies’ “we know best” approach that 
ignored environmental consequences would become a thing of 
the past.40 
As an umbrella statute, NEPA applies to all federal 
agencies, regardless of their underlying substantive mandates. 
Specifically, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare a 
“detailed statement,” known as an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), on the environmental impacts of proposed 
legislation and major federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.41 An EIS must discuss, 
                                                 
37. Id. 
38. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its 
Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010). 
39. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004); Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347 (1989). 
40. ENVTL. LAW INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 3 (2010), http://www.eli.org/research-
report/nepa-success-stories-celebrating-40-years-transparency-and-open-
government [http://perma.cc/8yuk-r7ud]. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). Because consideration of a “major federal action[] 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” is what triggers the 
requirement to prepare an EIS, agencies can also first prepare a smaller, shorter 
document called an Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine whether an EIS is 
required. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757. If the EA indicates that no significant impact 
is likely, then the agency can release a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) and 
carry on with the proposed action. Id. at 757–58. Otherwise, the agency must then 
conduct a full-scale EIS. See id. 
9
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inter alia: (1) the environmental impacts of the proposed 
action; (2) the unavoidable adverse environmental effects 
should the proposed course of action be implemented; (3) 
alternatives to the proposed action; and (4) whether the 
proposed action may result in the irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment of resources.42 The Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has 
promulgated regulations concerning the scope, extent, and 
timing of an EIS.43 These regulations bind federal agencies by 
executive order and receive “substantial deference” from 
courts.44 
1. NEPA Requires Analyzing Indirect Effects, Including 
Upstream Emissions 
Adequately analyzing the environmental impact of a 
proposed project requires agencies to consider three kinds of 
environmental effects. First, “direct” effects are those that “are 
caused by the action and occur at the same time and place,”45 
such as the local environmental effects associated with 
constructing or modifying an LNG export facility. Second, 
agencies must also consider “indirect” environmental effects 
that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther 
removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”46 For 
example, in a case involving a new railway that would reduce 
the cost of delivering coal, the permitting agency was required 
to address the resulting increase in coal consumption and the 
effects thereof as “indirect effects.”47 Finally, an agency must 
consider an action’s “cumulative impact”—the impact on the 
environment that would result “from the incremental impact of 
the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
                                                 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
43. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2017). 
44. Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)). 
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017). 
46. Id. 
47. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
10
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foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or 
non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions.”48 
For fossil fuel extraction or infrastructure projects, litigation 
often centers on whether the environmental review considers 
all of the indirect effects that reasonably result from a 
proposed project. Akin to the notion of proximate cause in tort 
law, an impact is “reasonably foreseeable” if a person of 
ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a 
decision.49 The process can boil down to “look[ing] to the 
underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a 
manageable line between those causal changes that may make 
an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”50 
Thus, agencies seeking to avoid review of indirect effects 
may argue that indirect effects—such as domestic greenhouse 
gas emissions from export-triggered natural gas production—
are not reasonably foreseeable. The D.C. Circuit’s recent 
decision in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission indicates that environmental groups may be able 
to overcome this hurdle by appealing to the project’s purpose.51 
For example, in Sierra Club, environmental groups and 
landowners challenged FERC’s decision to approve the 
construction and operation of three new interstate natural gas 
pipelines in the southeastern United States.52 The challengers’ 
primary argument was that FERC had failed to assess the 
downstream environmental impacts of the pipeline, namely 
the greenhouse gas emissions that would result from burning 
gas carried by the new pipelines.53 The D.C. Circuit agreed, 
pointing out that if the purpose of building pipelines was to 
transport the gas for its use, greenhouse gas emissions 
resulting from its use were surely foreseeable.54 
                                                 
48. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2017). 
49. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 
420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
50.  Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)). 
51. See Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
52. Id. at 1363. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1371–72 (“What are the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ effects of authorizing a 
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Occasionally, the dearth of adequate information regarding 
a project’s indirect effects makes meaningful analysis 
impossible. Thus, while CEQ regulations expressly address 
how agencies should handle missing or incomplete information 
about potentially significant environmental impacts,55 the 
feasibility of estimating environmental effects can bleed into a 
court’s analysis of whether those effects are foreseeable.56 
NEPA reviews, however, necessarily involve some reasonable 
forecasting, and agencies may sometimes need to make 
educated assumptions because it is their responsibility to 
predict the environmental effects of a proposed action before 
those effects are fully known.57 In other words, courts have 
refused to allow agencies to shirk their responsibility by 
merely “labeling any and all discussion of future 
environmental effects as a ‘crystal ball inquiry.’”58 
Furthermore, even if the extent of the effect is speculative, 
the nature of the effect may be reasonably foreseeable, 
meaning that an agency cannot simply ignore this effect in its 
NEPA review. For example, in Mid States Coalition for 
Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit 
found inadequate the Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) 
EIS analyzing the construction and rehabilitation of rail lines 
to service coal mines in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin.59 
Environmental groups argued that STB had failed to consider 
greenhouse gas effects associated with an increase in supply of 
                                                 
pipeline that will transport natural gas to Florida power plants? First, that gas will be 
burned in those power plants. This is not just ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ it is the 
project’s entire purpose, as the pipeline developers themselves explain.”). 
55. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2017) (requiring agencies to obtain missing 
information essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives, unless the costs of 
obtaining the information are exorbitant or the information is simply unavailable). 
56. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1373–74. 
57. Albert C. Lin notes that both tort law and NEPA use the term “foreseeable,” but 
in different ways. Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the 
Supreme Court’s 2003-04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 610 (2005). In tort law, 
proximate cause is a screening device to limit liability by asking what is fair to impose 
on the defendant. See id. By contrast, NEPA does not involve substantive liability, and 
the statute’s information-forcing aims favor a broader disclosure of effects, so a less 
restrictive version of causation is appropriate. See id. 
58. Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
59. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
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coal to power plants that would occur as a result of the 
upgrades.60 STB argued that it would “need to know where 
[the power plants would] be built, and how much coal these 
new unnamed power plants would use” in order to analyze 
emissions from increased coal consumption.61 The Eighth 
Circuit concluded that even if the full extent of the 
environmental impacts of the increased coal usage was not 
known, the nature of the ensuing environmental effects plainly 
was.62 “[W]hen the nature of the effect is reasonably 
foreseeable but its extent is not,” the court concluded, an 
agency “may not simply ignore the effect” in its NEPA 
review.63 
The nature-extent dichotomy is important because, as 
discussed below, one of the studies in the record before FERC 
and DOE regarding the Freeport LNG Terminal expressly 
concluded that increased natural gas exports raise domestic 
natural gas prices, reduce domestic natural gas consumption, 
and shift the electric power sector back to coal-fired 
generation.64 Because the nature of these effects of increased 
LNG exports are reasonably foreseeable, one would expect a 
court to insist that these impacts receive due attention. 
Occasionally an agency will not dispute that foreseeable 
indirect effects would have major environmental consequences 
but claim that they can lawfully ignore these effects because 
they are not directly caused by the agency’s decision. 
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen65 offers these 
agencies a Supreme Court case to cite in support of this 
proposition. The litigation in Public Citizen followed President 
Bush’s announcement that he intended to end a moratorium 
that prevented Mexican trucks from operating within the 
United States.66 Congress subsequently passed legislation 
barring the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) from spending funds to process applications for 
                                                 
60. Id. at 549–50. 
61. Id. at 549. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (emphasis in original). 
64. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6. 
65. 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004). 
66. Id. at 760. 
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Mexican trucks to operate in the United States until it issued 
rules containing certain safety-monitoring requirements.67 
Accordingly, FMCSA promulgated rules to establish an 
application and safety inspection regime for Mexican trucks 
seeking to conduct cross-border operations.68 FMCSA prepared 
an Environmental Assessment of its new rules.69 The 
assessment only considered the direct environmental effects of 
the proposed regulations—i.e., the impacts of increasing the 
number of roadside inspections of Mexican trucks—and 
ignored the proposed regulation’s indirect environmental 
impacts, namely greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the 
increased presence of Mexican trucks in the United States.70 
Environmental groups challenged the rules, arguing that 
FMCSA violated NEPA by failing to consider the effects of 
increased Mexican truck traffic that would result from lifting 
the moratorium.71 The Supreme Court unanimously held that 
NEPA did not require such an evaluation.72 It reasoned that 
“where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due 
to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the 
agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the 
effect.”73 In other words, because only the President, and not 
the agency, could authorize (or not authorize) cross-border 
operations from Mexican motor carriers, the agency did not 
need to consider the environmental effects arising from the 
entry of Mexican trucks.74 
At least in the natural gas pipeline context, the D.C. Circuit 
has not applied an overly-expansive reading of Public Citizen. 
For example, in the above-mentioned Sierra Club v. Federal 
                                                 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 760–62. 
69. As explained in supra text accompanying note 41 and Section III.A, the 
difference between an EIS and an EA is important. Public Citizen challenged 
FMCSA’s decision to perform the more limited EA rather than an EIS. Pub. Citizen, 
541 U.S. at 765. Essentially, it argued that had the agency taken account of the 
indirect impact of the increased trucks, it would have been significant enough to 
warrant an EIS. Id. at 763. 
70. Id. at 754. 
71. Id. at 763. 
72. Id. at 754–55. 
73. Id. at 770 (internal quotations omitted). 
74. Id. 
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Energy Regulatory Commission, environmental groups claimed 
that FERC’s environmental review for new pipelines to service 
Florida power plants should have assessed greenhouse gas 
emissions from the new and existing power plants.75 
Like the two-tiered statutory framework at issue in Public 
Citizen, under Florida law, the Florida Power Plant Board 
authorizes new power plants but FERC authorizes the 
construction of interstate pipelines necessary to carry the 
natural gas.76 The D.C. Circuit still found, however, that FERC 
needed to assess the resulting emissions. The court’s decision 
to avoid an overly-broad application of Public Citizen makes 
sense. Had the D.C. Circuit allowed FERC to ignore the 
emissions resulting from its decision to authorize new 
pipelines, it would have eviscerated NEPA regulations calling 
for consideration of “growth-inducing effects” and run counter 
to case law requiring agencies to evaluate effects outside of 
their jurisdiction.77 
2. NEPA Requires Agencies to Consider “Connected Actions” 
In addition to considering indirect effects of granting a 
permit for a fossil fuel infrastructure project, NEPA requires 
agencies to consider the environmental effects of actions 
“connected” to the one under review.78 Per CEQ regulations, 
agencies must prepare a single environmental review when the 
proposal under review: 
 
(i) Automatically trigger[s] other actions which may 
require environmental impact statements. 
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are 
taken previously or simultaneously. 
                                                 
75. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373–74, 1381 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
76. Id. at 1381. 
77. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting NEPA would “wither away 
in disuse, [if] applied only to those environmental issues wholly unregulated by any 
other federal, state or regional body”); see also Ark. Nature All. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 266 F. Supp.2d 876, 891–92 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Friends of the Earth v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 109 F. Supp.2d 30, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2000). 
78. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2017). 
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(iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger action and 
depend on the larger action for their justification.79 
 
This anti-segmentation principle guards against dividing a 
project into multiple proposals, and separately analyzing each 
of the portions to avoid consideration of an entire action’s 
effects on the environment.80 
Thomas v. Peterson81 is the leading case exemplifying how 
courts use an “independent utility” test to ferret out improper 
segmentation. In Thomas, the Forest Service approved a 
logging road designed to transport timber from pending timber 
sales. “It is clear,” the Ninth Circuit stated, “that the timber 
sales cannot proceed without the road, and the road would not 
be built but for the contemplated timber sales.”82 The court 
ordered the Forest Service to prepare and consider an EIS that 
analyzed the combined impacts of the road and the timber 
sales. If the timber sales were sufficiently certain to justify 
construction of the road, the Ninth Circuit concluded, then 
they were sufficiently certain for their environmental impacts 
to be analyzed along with those of the road.83 More recently, 
the D.C. Circuit considered connected actions in the natural 
gas infrastructure context. Reiterating the independent utility 
test, the court concluded that FERC improperly segmented 
review of a series of financially and functionally 
interdependent natural gas pipeline improvements.84 
Considering the attention that both CEQ regulations and 
courts have given to ensure that the scope of environmental 
reviews is properly defined, one might expect the anti-
                                                 
79. Id. 
80. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that NEPA prevents an agency from “illegally segmenting projects in order 
to avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on the environment”); Pac. Coast 
Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012). 
81. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Pac. Coast, 693 F.3d at 1098 (“The crux of 
the [independent utility] test is whether each of two projects would have taken place 
with or without the other . . . .”). 
82. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758. 
83. Id. at 761. 
84. Del. River Keeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 
1313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“When one of the projects might reasonably have been 
completed without the existence of the other, the two projects have independent utility 
and are not ‘connected’ for NEPA’s purposes.”). 
16
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segmentation principles appearing in connected actions cases 
to play a key role in analyzing the sufficiency of the 
environmental reviews undertaken by FERC. After all, the 
construction, upgrades, and operation of facilities permitted by 
FERC are for the explicit purpose of enabling LNG exports.85 
Yet, as discussed below, the D.C. Circuit has thus far declined 
to decide whether the Natural Gas Act’s two-tier permitting 
process creates “connected actions” that must be analyzed in a 
single EIS.86 
3. NEPA Requires Agencies to Work Together 
Congress could not have been clearer about directing federal 
agencies to conduct environmental reviews jointly.87 Per CEQ 
regulations, federal agencies with jurisdiction over different 
aspects of a single proposal designate a “lead agency” to 
supervise the preparation of a common EIS,
 
with the other 
agencies acting as “cooperating agencies.”88 Cooperating 
agencies must participate in the scoping process.89 
Furthermore, cooperating agencies assume “responsibility for 
developing information and preparing environmental 
analyses” concerning topics over “which the cooperating agency 
has special expertise,” should the lead agency so request.90 
These requirements warrant particular attention 
considering the two-tier permitting structure of the Natural 
Gas Act. Recall that the Act designates FERC to be “the lead 
agency for the purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal 
authorizations and for the purposes of complying with 
[NEPA].”91 In practice, DOE participates in FERC’s limited 
environmental review as a “cooperating agency,” and 
                                                 
85. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DOE/EIS-0487, FREEPORT LNG 
LIQUEFACTION PROJECT PHASE II MODIFICATION PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT 1-3 (2014). 
86. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (“Prior to making any detailed statement, the 
responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal 
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any 
environmental impact involved.”). 
88. Id. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.5, 1508.16. 
89. Id. § 1501.6. 
90. Id. 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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incorporates the FERC review for purposes of satisfying its 
own responsibilities.92 Cooperation between the two agencies 
to conduct as complete an environmental review as possible, at 
the earliest possible stage, would make practical sense given 
that FERC-level decisions about a facility’s capacity 
necessarily affect DOE-level decisions about how much LNG 
may be exported. 
4. NEPA Requires Agencies to Take a “Hard Look” at 
Environmental Impacts at the Earliest Possible Time 
In addition to NEPA’s requirements concerning the scope 
and procedure of environmental reviews, “timing is one of 
NEPA’s central themes. An assessment must be ‘prepared 
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important 
contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be 
used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.’”93 The 
phrase “early enough” means “at the earliest possible time to 
insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental 
values.”94 By referring to NEPA’s requirements as “action 
forcing,”95 the Supreme Court embraced the rule that 
environmental reviews “shall be prepared at the feasibility 
analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later 
stage if necessary.”96 
The requirement for environmental reviews to be completed 
at the “go-no go” stage has particular ramifications for DOE, 
given its thirty-year history of granting conditional approval 
for requests to export LNG before completing its 
                                                 
92. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 41–
42 (D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a) (2017) (providing that cooperating 
agencies may only adopt the EIS of a lead agency if “[it] meets the standards for an 
adequate statement under these regulations.”). 
93. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NEPA’s 
effectiveness depends entirely on involving environmental considerations in the initial 
decisionmaking process.”);  see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5 (2017); see also Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (explaining that NEPA 
“ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will 
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental 
impacts”); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1988). 
94. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979). 
95. Id. at 350. 
96. Id. at 351 n.3. 
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environmental review.97 In 2014, however, DOE revised its 
procedures, stating that it would suspend its practice of 
issuing conditional decisions.98 Whether or not DOE’s new 
procedures signal a new commitment to NEPA principles 
remains to be seen; DOE has admitted that it will still begin 
its public interest analysis prior to completion of NEPA review, 
but it will not issue a final decision before the NEPA review is 
complete.99 
Of course, NEPA does not require that agency officials be 
“subjectively impartial,” but “[t]he statute does require . . . that 
projects be objectively evaluated” before an agency commits 
itself to a particular decision.100 For example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and 
other federal defendants violated NEPA by promising their 
support for the Makah Indian Tribe’s proposal for a quota of 
gray whales for subsistence and ceremonial use before 
undertaking the requisite environmental review.101 In so doing, 
the court captured the essence of NEPA: “the comprehensive 
‘hard look’ . . . required by the statute must be timely, and it 
must be taken objectively and in good faith, not as an exercise 
in form over substance, and not as a subterfuge designed to 
rationalize a decision already made.”102 
II. PERMITTING IN ACTION: THE CASE IN FREEPORT 
In contrast to courts’ consistent opinions holding that 
downstream emissions fall within the scope of indirect impacts 
that should be reviewed under NEPA in other contexts, courts’ 
treatment of LNG export facilities has thus far proven 
unique.103 For this reason, the Sierra Club’s parallel challenges 
                                                 
97. Procedures for Liquefied Natural Gas Export Decisions, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,132, 
48,133 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000). 
101. Id. at 1143. 
102. Id. at 1142. 
103. Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 143 
(2017); see also Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373–
74 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (FERC must consider downstream effects of pipelines); Mid States 
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to the expansion of the Freeport facility and related exports 
deserve careful scrutiny. 
In 2004, FERC authorized Freeport to site, construct, and 
operate an LNG import terminal on Quintana Island in 
Brazoria County, Texas.104 In 2011 and 2012, amid the spike in 
domestic gas production, Freeport sought FERC’s approval for 
new upgrades and facilities to allow for gas exports.105 
Pursuant to its statutory duty to coordinate the environmental 
review, FERC prepared an EIS.106 The DOE, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of 
Transportation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration all 
participated in the consolidated environmental review as 
cooperating agencies.107 
Prior to FERC’s EIS, Freeport separately sought 
authorization from DOE to export natural gas.108 The 
Department approved Freeport’s request to export gas to free-
trade agreement countries in February 2011—requests that 
the Natural Gas Act requires to be approved without delay109—
and gave conditional approval for exporting LNG to the 
requested non-free trade countries in May and November 
2013, also before FERC released its EIS.110 The Department’s 
final authorization, it explained, would be contingent on 
satisfactory completion of FERC’s ongoing environmental 
review process.111 
FERC released its Final EIS in June 2014.112 Focusing on 
the site-specific effects of the construction, it stated that the 
Freeport project “would result in some adverse environmental 
impacts,” which would be “mostly temporary and short-term[,]” 
                                                 
Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (agency 
must consider effect of reducing the price of coal when approving upgrades to coal rail 
line). 





109. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012). 
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provided Freeport implemented the mitigation conditions 
FERC proposed.113 FERC proceeded to authorize the 
construction, enabling the export of 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas 
per day.114 Combining Freeport with the other projects 
approved or pending before FERC at the time, FERC had 
approved exports totaling 12.5 billion cubic feet per day––a 
volume equivalent to 19% of the nation-wide demand for 
natural gas.115 DOE adopted FERC’s EIS in full, and approved 
Freeport’s application in November 2014.116 
A. Freeport I: The FERC Review 
The Sierra Club intervened in the FERC permitting process 
and sought a re-hearing, asserting that FERC’s NEPA analysis 
failed to address the indirect impacts of upgrading the 
Freeport facilities to pave the way for exporting LNG. Sierra 
Club’s basic contention was fairly intuitive: the sole purpose of 
the Freeport upgrade and construction project was to export 
natural gas and yet FERC’s environmental review failed to 
evaluate how exporting natural gas from Freeport would 
contribute to rising domestic prices and increased coal 
consumption.117 FERC claimed (1) that increases in gas 
production and coal use, if any, are caused by the DOE permit, 
meaning they are not sufficiently causally related to the 
Freeport project; and (2) that these effects were not reasonably 
foreseeable to warrant analysis.118 FERC denied the petition 
for re-hearing and, the next day, DOE issued its final order 
authorizing Freeport to export natural gas to non-free trade 
agreement countries.119 
                                                 
113. Id. 
114. Id.; Order Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 
Freeport LNG Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 1, 2, 17 (July 30, 2014). 
115. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 10, Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2015) 
(No. 14-1275). 
116. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
117. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 42–43. 
118. See id. at 48; Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG 
Development, L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
119. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 43. 
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The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenges to FERC’s NEPA 
review.120 In doing so, it cited Public Citizen for the proposition 
that FERC could lawfully ignore indirect effects of the 
anticipated export of natural gas “because the Department of 
Energy, not the Commission, has sole authority to license the 
export of any natural gas going through the Freeport 
facilities.”121 The court explained that in the specific 
circumstance where, as here, an agency “has no ability to 
prevent a certain effect due to” that agency’s “limited statutory 
authority over the relevant action[],” then that action “cannot 
be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect for NEPA 
purposes.”122 According to the court: 
 
The Department’s independent decision to allow 
exports—a decision over which the Commission has no 
regulatory authority—breaks the NEPA causal chain 
and absolves the Commission of responsibility to 
include in its NEPA analysis considerations that it 
“could not act on” and for which it cannot be “the legally 
relevant cause.”123 
 
Sierra Club argued that LNG exports from the Freeport 
facility could not occur absent the liquefaction infrastructure 
that FERC had authorized, so the fact that subsequent 
decisions that would affect the extent of resulting 
environmental impacts did not alleviate FERC’s obligation to 
assess their nature.124 Additionally, undisputed record 
evidence made clear that exporting natural gas requires 
increasing domestic natural gas production—sixty to seventy 
percent of LNG exports will come from new natural gas 
production.125 In other words, it was not just foreseeable that 
domestic production would rise to meet demand for exporting 
LNG, it had already been foreseen. Therefore, FERC should 
have addressed those environmental effects. 
                                                 
120. Id. at 51. 
121. Id. at 47. 
122. Id. (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 771 (2004)). 
123. Id. at 48 (citing Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 769). 
124. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 10. 
125. See id. at 17–18; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6. 
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The D.C. Circuit appeared to sidestep the foreseeability 
argument, reiterating that “critical to triggering that chain of 
events is the intervening action of the Department of Energy 
in granting an export license.”126 Even though the 
environmental impacts would not occur but for FERC’s 
approval of the facilities to make export possible, the D.C. 
Circuit framed the resolution of the question differently: 
because the environmental groups had not identified impacts 
that would occur but for the DOE decision to authorize exports, 
FERC need not examine the foreseeable effects thereof.127 This 
reasoning implicitly suggests that even when an “intervening” 
cause is foreseeable—which was certainly the case, given 
DOE’s conditional approval of the export—it can still trump 
FERC’s obligations to assess the indirect consequences of its 
actions. 
B. Freeport II: The DOE Review 
While the DOE adopted the EIS prepared by FERC in full, it 
also supplemented it with additional reports. An addendum to 
the EIS disclosed how increased natural gas drilling would 
impact the water, air, and land resources surrounding 
production activities, but failed to link any of these impacts to 
any particular amount of exports.128 Additionally, the 
Department commissioned the National Energy Technology 
Laboratory (NETL) to prepare a report on the lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions of LNG exports.129 Notably, the 
generalized NETL report was applicable to all LNG exports, 
thus failing to provide any estimate of the greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the particular export request under 
                                                 
126. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 47–48. 
127. Id. at 48 (noting that the challengers had failed to identify “any specific and 
causally linear indirect consequences that could reasonably be foreseen and factored 
into the Commission’s environmental analysis that exist apart from the intervening 
Department of Energy decision to authorize exports”) (emphasis added). 
128. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Addendum to 
Environmental Review Documents Concerning Exports of Natural Gas from the 
United States, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,132 (Aug. 15, 2014)). 
129. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE 
GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES 
(2014) (published at 79 Fed. Reg. 32,260 (June 4, 2014)). 
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review.130 As a result, DOE never addressed how much 
additional greenhouse gas pollution could be emitted in the 
United States as a result of the Freeport proposal.131 
The Sierra Club challenged DOE’s NEPA review because of 
the Department’s failure to disclose the domestic upstream 
emissions triggered by the volume of gas that would be 
exported from the Freeport terminal.132 The generalized 
information it had provided was adequate, DOE responded, 
because Sierra Club was able to use this information to 
develop ballpark estimates of the impacts of induced gas 
production for the particular proposal under review.133 The 
D.C. Circuit sided with DOE.134 It did not, however, articulate 
a reason why, consistent with NEPA requirements, DOE could 
avoid estimating the greenhouse gas emissions associated with 
the specific exports under review.135 
III. CRITICISMS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
The D.C. Circuit’s Freeport I and Freeport II decisions have 
effectively created a regulatory void, hiding the domestic 
effects of LNG exports from view.136 Thus, despite DOE’s own 
recognition that environmental effects are a component of its 
public interest determination imposed by the Natural Gas 
Act,137 the Department remains free to conclude that the 
benefits of approval outweigh its environmental impacts 
without ever having adequately identified those impacts. This 
outcome runs counter to NEPA’s “twin aims” of ensuring that 
                                                 
130. Jessica Wentz, Fossil Fuel Projects and NEPA Reviews: Two New Decisions on 
the Proper Scope of Analysis for Indirect and Cumulative Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
WESTLAW J. ENVTL., Sept. 2017, at 3, 3. 
131. Freeport II, 867 F.3d at 198–202. 
132. Petitioner’s Final Reply Brief at 27, Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 
2016) (No. 15-1489). 
133.  Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 57. 
134. Freeport II, 867 F.3d at 196–97. 
135. Id. 
136. Wentz, supra note 130, at 3. 
137. See Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 60 (noting DOE’s duty is 
to identify and evaluate the factors relevant to the public interest, specifically listing 
environmental factors); see also id. at 36 (noting DOE considered a study estimating 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions across all proposed exports, but not the specific 
facility at issue). 
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federal agencies have considered the environmental impacts of 
a proposed action and that the public is made aware of these 
environmental consequences.138 
A. Freeport I’s Misapplication of Public Citizen 
In deciding that FERC did not have to analyze export-
induced gas production because DOE’s decision to allow 
exports “breaks the NEPA causal chain and absolves the 
Commission of responsibility,” the Freeport I court broadened 
and misapplied Public Citizen.139 As recounted in Section I.B.1, 
Public Citizen resolved a challenge to the environmental 
review undertaken by FMCSA before unveiling the safety 
regulations allowing President Bush to officially authorize 
Mexican motor carriers to operate in the United States. Re-
parsing Public Citizen reveals how the D.C. Circuit has 
misapplied its holdings. 
In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court found that FMCSA did 
not violate NEPA by failing to discuss the greenhouse gas 
emissions sure to be released by the increase in Mexican 
trucks operating in the United States for two reasons. First, 
the Supreme Court found that the FMCSA regulations were 
not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused 
by the trucks because the President would still need to lift the 
moratorium allowing more Mexican motor vehicles to travel 
north.140 Recall that FMCSA only promulgated its rules to 
establish the safety inspection regime for Mexican trucks after 
President Bush announced that he intended to authorize the 
operation of Mexican trucks within the United States,141 but 
Congress had barred FMCSA from spending funds to process 
applications for Mexican trucks to operate in the United States 
until it issued safety-monitoring rules.142 Thus, FMCSA’s 
                                                 
138. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347 (1989); 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). 
139. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. 
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 769 (2004)). 
140. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770. 
141. Id. at 760. 
142. Id. 
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decision on the safety regulations would not necessarily affect 
the number of trucks that would enter the country.143 
Not only was the agency powerless to change the President’s 
decision to lift the moratorium on Mexican trucks, but FMCSA 
had no authority to mitigate any potential environmental 
impacts of the President’s decision. FMCSA governs motor 
carrier safety; it had no statutory authority to impose or 
enforce emissions controls.144 The agency’s limited discretion 
raised questions about its ability to act on the information that 
it would have gleaned from completing an EIS.145 The Court 
reasoned: 
 
[R]equiring FMCSA to consider the environmental 
effects of the entry of Mexican trucks would fulfill 
neither of the statutory purposes [of ensuring that the 
agency, in reaching its decision, would have available, 
and would carefully consider, detailed information 
concerning significant environmental impacts and of 
guaranteeing that relevant information would be made 
available to the larger audience that might also play a 
role in both the decisionmaking process and 
implementation of that decision].146 
 
Put simply, FMCSA would be unable to act on the findings 
of an EIS even if it conducted one.147  As a result, Public 
Citizen is likely best understood as a case applying an “implied 
exemption,”148 which releases agencies from NEPA obligations 
when they undertake “non-discretionary” actions. If an agency 
can characterize its action as nondiscretionary, most (if not all) 
circuits recognize an implied exemption from NEPA’s 
                                                 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 758–59. 
145. Id. at 770 (noting the FMCSA had “no ability to prevent a certain effect due to 
its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions”). 
146. Id. at 768. 
147. Id. at 769. 
148. See generally Kyle Robisch, The NEPA Implied Exemption Doctrine: How a 
Novel and Creeping Common Law Exemption Threatens to Undermine the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 173 (2014); J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, 
Agencies Running from Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 97 (2016). 
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requirements.149 The logic is simple: NEPA was designed to 
introduce environmental considerations into the decision-
making processes of agencies that have the ability to react to 
environmental consequences when taking action, but if an 
agency’s course is predetermined, no measure of 
environmental impacts could sway the agency’s course of 
action. In fact, commentators have argued that today’s 
Supreme Court would likely uphold the implied exemption 
doctrine, citing Public Citizen as evidence.150 
Given this background, it becomes apparent that had the 
Freeport I court applied a narrow reading of Public Citizen, it 
would have found the case easily distinguishable from the 
issues it faced in the LNG export context. The decision to 
ultimately allow Mexican trucks to cross the border—the 
“intervening cause” of the increased truck emissions—was to 
be made by the President. As one scholar aptly details, the 
government litigated the Public Citizen case on the theory that 
it presented an issue not of interpreting NEPA, but of 
presidential discretion, arguing that the President “must be 
able to act quickly and with assurance to implement the 
decisions that are entrusted personally to him,” and that any 
ruling to the contrary would have massive international trade 
ramifications.151 In the LNG context, however, the “intervening 
cause” is a co-equal agency already required to join the 
environmental review. 
Nor does the FERC-DOE decision-making process in the 
LNG context mimic the FMCSA-Presidential two-step in 
Public Citizen. In Public Citizen, the President made his 
decision to lift the moratorium before FMCSA issued its 
regulations; the analogous situation would be if DOE had 
approved a permit to export natural gas before FERC 
authorized the construction of facilities necessary to do so. Yet 
in the context of LNG exports, FERC must make a 
determination that authorizing the construction or 
                                                 
149. Robisch, supra note 148, at 186 (collecting cases); see also Sierra Club v. 
Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases demonstrating that 
nondiscretionary agency action is excused from the operation of NEPA). 
150. Robisch, supra note 148, at 193. 
151. Jeannette MacMillan, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in 
Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks 
(Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 511 (2005). 
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modification of an export facility is not contrary to the public 
interest. FERC alone approves permits for constructing the 
facilities necessary to export gas, and it has broad authority to 
impose any conditions on approval deemed “necessary or 
appropriate.”152 Thus, unlike FMCSA, FERC does have the 
ability to prevent the LNG exports and their inevitable effects. 
After all, FERC authorization for modifying facilities or 
liquefying a particular capacity of natural gas for export quite 
literally makes the exports possible. 
Additionally, requiring FERC to estimate and disclose the 
upstream greenhouse gas pollution caused by producing 
additional gas for export would ensure that FERC had 
considered the potentially significant environmental impacts of 
its authorizations. This information is especially critical in the 
context of exports to free trade nations, which DOE must 
automatically authorize.153 Assessing the upstream impacts of 
exports by FERC at the construction stage may be the only 
time to make such information available “to a larger audience 
that might also play role in both decision making process and 
implementation of that decision.”154 
The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Sierra Club v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission lays bare the trouble with 
Freeport I’s broad reading of Public Citizen. Recall that in 
Sierra Club, the D.C. Circuit required FERC to examine the 
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from power plants served 
by FERC-approved pipelines—despite the fact that in Florida, 
new power plants must receive a separate state permit. Re-
characterizing Freeport I, the D.C. Circuit wrote: 
 
[O]ur holding in the LNG cases was not based solely on 
the fact that a second agency’s approval was necessary 
before the environmental effect at issue could occur. 
Rather, [Freeport I] and its companion cases rested on 
the premise that FERC had no legal authority to 
                                                 
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (granting the Commission “the exclusive 
authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or 
operation of an [export] terminal”); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(3)(A) (2012) (authorizing the 
Commission to impose any conditions on those terminals that it finds to be “necessary 
or appropriate”). 
153. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012). 
154. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004). 
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prevent the adverse environmental effects of natural 
gas exports.155 
 
As the D.C. Circuit asks rhetorically: then “[w]hat did the 
[Freeport I] court mean by its statement that FERC could not 
prevent the effects of exports? After all, FERC did have legal 
authority to deny an upgrade license for a natural gas export 
terminal.”156 The answer, the court concludes, is that “FERC 
was forbidden to rely on the effects of gas exports as a 
justification for denying an upgrade license,” citing Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.157 for the proposition that an agency acts 
arbitrarily and capriciously if it makes a decision based on 
“factors which Congress had not intended it to consider.”158 
According to the court, because FERC was operating pursuant 
to a “narrow” delegation of authority from the DOE, the 
Commission “would have acted unlawfully had it refused an 
upgrade license on grounds that it did not have delegated 
authority to consider.”159 
Even the D.C. Circuit’s attempted re-characterization 
strains credulity. First, the D.C. Circuit describes FERC’s 
delegated authority as “narrow,” but provides no citation for 
limitations on the factors that FERC could consider in its own 
public interest determination.160 Nor did the Sierra Club court 
acknowledge a prior statement by the D.C. Circuit in Freeport 
I that expressly reserved consideration of the scope of FERC’s 
delegated authority.161 This is perhaps no surprise; the 
Natural Gas Act explicitly provides that applications for 
constructing LNG facilities may be approved “in whole or in 
part. . .[w]ith such modification and upon such terms and 
conditions as the Commission may find necessary or 
                                                 
155. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 
2017). 
156. Id. 
157. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
158. Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1373. 
159. Id. 
160. See id. 
161. Wentz, supra note 130, at 3. 
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appropriate.”162 FERC itself even explicitly stated that its 
refusal to consider the effects of increased gas production was 
based on a conclusion that NEPA did not so require, not 
because these effects fell within DOE’s authority.163 
Second, and more importantly, if the D.C. Circuit’s Sierra 
Club reasoning is replicated by other courts, then the scope of 
a NEPA analysis becomes only as broad as substantive 
mandates of the underlying act. NEPA then becomes only a 
piggy-back statute rather than a standalone law that infuses 
an environmental consciousness into the decision-making of all 
federal agencies, no matter their underlying substantive 
mandates. Put another way, even if it would be arbitrary and 
capricious for FERC to deny a permit on environmental 
grounds, NEPA still imposes an independent duty on FERC to 
consider the direct and indirect consequences of its actions. 
There is no doubt that Freeport and other companies with 
pending proposals to export LNG cheered the D.C. Circuit’s 
Freeport I decision. However, the Court’s opinion—and 
subsequent attempted re-characterizations—failed to both 
recognize the eccentricities of Public Citizen and appreciate 
that NEPA imposes a separate, independent duty on FERC, 
untethered to the Natural Gas Act. 
B. Freeport II’s Failure to Require the Department of Energy 
to Examine Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Freeport II, which held that DOE could lawfully ignore the 
domestic greenhouse gas emissions caused by authorizing gas 
export from the Freeport facility, faces a different set of 
criticisms. The D.C. Circuit agreed that DOE’s generalized 
impact assessment was not tailored to any specific level of 
exports but nonetheless upheld the analysis.164 It did not 
explain why, consistent with NEPA, DOE could avoid 
                                                 
162. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). The Commission has plenary authority to condition 
its approvals of LNG facilities under section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. See Order 
Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, Freeport LNG 
Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 8 n.12 (July 30, 2014) (citing Distrigas Corp. 
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 495 F.2d 1057, 1063–64 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
834 (1974), and Dynegy LNG Production Terminal, L.P., 97 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2001)). 
163. See Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG Development, 
L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014); see also supra text accompanying note 24. 
164. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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estimating the upstream greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with the specific exports under review.165 
The court’s failure is particularly striking. NEPA “ensures 
that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, 
and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning 
significant environmental impacts[.]”166 And not only had DOE 
explicitly recognized that “environmental factors” fall within 
the scope of its public interest review for export authorizations, 
but the Department had already generated all of the modeling 
it would need to estimate domestic upstream emissions 
associated with the particular proposal it was reviewing.167 
At bottom, there is simply no reason, consistent with NEPA, 
for DOE to exclude consideration of these domestic upstream 
emissions. For DOE to recognize that LNG exports will 
increase the demand for natural gas production,168 that this 
increased demand will result in increased domestic production 
of natural gas from unconventional sources,169 and that it has 
the tools to model associated emissions but refused to do so 
should have concerned the D.C. Circuit. 
IV. THE PATH FORWARD: TOWARD A UNIFIED FERC-
DOE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
As the D.C. Circuit itself pointed out, the Freeport I decision 
did not decide whether FERC “impermissibly ‘segmented’ its 
review of the Freeport Projects from the larger inter-agency 
export authorization process, and ‘thereby fail[ed] to address 
the true scope and impact of the activities that should be under 
consideration.’”170 Nor did it decide whether the “Commission’s 
                                                 
165. Id. at 200–01. 
166. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) 
(emphasis added). 
167. Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 56. 
168. Id. at 53; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6 (natural gas exports 
would be offset by increased production). 
169. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADDENDUM TO ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW DOCUMENTS 
CONCERNING EXPORTS OF NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2014) (“LNG 
export volumes would be offset by some combination of increased domestic production 
of natural gas (principally from unconventional sources), decreased domestic 
consumption of natural gas, and an adjustment to the U.S. net trade balance in 
natural gas with Canada and Mexico.”). 
170. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Del. Riverkeeper Network v. 
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construction authorizations and the Department’s export 
authorizations qualified as ‘connected actions’ for purposes of 
NEPA review.”171 Therefore, advocates seeking to require 
disclosure of the upstream effects of natural gas exports before 
the agencies have already given their approval could seek to 
require a unified environmental review process by 
characterizing the two permits as “connected actions.” This 
strategy would have the benefit of significant support from 
NEPA case law and the structure of the Natural Gas Act itself. 
As discussed in section I.B.2, the problem of segmentation is 
nothing new. When a federal agency reviews a number of 
related actions—such as proposals to upgrade different 
sections of the same pipeline system—it may attempt to 
narrow the scope of the environmental review by preparing 
impact statements on each action individually rather than for 
the entire group. The tunnel vision created by improper 
segmentation is especially problematic where the 
environmental impact of the whole project is greater than the 
sum of its component parts. 
Applying these principles, the permit to construct and 
operate an LNG export facility and the export permit are, in 
effect, a single course of action that require a single impact 
statement.172 First, FERC’s granting of a construction permit 
automatically triggers another action that requires NEPA 
review: a permit for exporting natural gas. 
Second, granting a permit for construction or modifying a 
facility depends on the DOE export permit for its 
justification—a fact that FERC has explicitly admitted.173 To 
put it in terms of the “utility test,” modifying or constructing 
an export facility would have no value except for exporting gas. 
FERC has also capitulated on this point, affirmatively stating 
that the Freeport upgrade project would only be financially 
feasible if DOE authorized exports.174 
                                                 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
171. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 45–46 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)). 
172. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (2017). 
173. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 85Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 1-3 (noting that the Freeport Project’s sole purpose is to facilitate 
exporting natural gas). 
174. Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG Development, L.P., 
149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 21 (Nov. 13, 2014) (“Had DOE denied Freeport LNG any 
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In general, successful challenges to broaden the scope of an 
agency’s review based on a “connected actions” theory involve a 
single agency’s segmentation of two separate projects, both 
under review by that same agency. But perhaps the logic of 
“connected actions” does not change if one agency’s action 
triggers another agency’s action, especially when the two 
agencies are operating under a responsibility-sharing 
mechanism like the Natural Gas Act. Indeed, at least one court 
has rebuffed an agency’s attempt to shirk a responsibility for 
reviewing connected actions under the authority of a separate 
agency.175 
In addition to drawing on segmentation cases, advocates 
should look to both the Natural Gas Act and CEQ regulations 
requiring interagency, unified review. CEQ regulations require 
agencies with jurisdiction over different aspects of a proposal 
to conduct joint environmental reviews by designating a “lead 
agency” to supervise the preparation of a common EIS with the 
other agencies acting as “cooperating agencies.”176 The Natural 
Gas Act itself designates FERC as “the lead agency for the 
purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal authorizations 
and for the purposes of complying with [NEPA].”177 Reading 
these provisions together supports the notion that the Natural 
Gas Act does not envision the bifurcated NEPA review that 
courts have imposed. In other words, upon receiving requests 
to modify facilities and export natural gas, FERC and DOE 
                                                 
authorization to export the commodity, it is highly unlikely that the company would 
have pursued its application before the Commission to construct facilities, because 
without commodity authorization, the facilities would have no use. Similarly, if DOE 
ultimately denies export authorization, the project would likely no longer be 
financially feasible, notwithstanding the Commission’s issuance of its section 3 
authorization to construct the facilities.”). 
175. See Colo. Wild Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 523 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D. Colo. 
2007) (suggesting that an action meeting the regulatory definition of a “connected 
action” nonetheless can be analyzed as a “connected action” in an EIS even if the 
decision-making agency does not have authority to control it); see also Burger & 
Wentz, supra note 103, at 171 (suggesting that connected actions argument “could be 
made even in the context of different types of approvals conducted by different 
agencies––for example, the approval of a coal lease or mining plan and the approval of 
a rail line that would service those mines may constitute “connected actions” that lack 
independent utility and should thus be reviewed in a single NEPA document.”) 
176. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.5, 1508.16 (2017). 
177. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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should lead a comprehensive environmental review prior to the 
construction stage. 
A third justification for requiring a unified review at the 
construction stage flows from one of NEPA’s key purposes: 
requiring agencies to look before they leap. Per CEQ 
regulations, an agency should begin its NEPA review process 
as soon as possible, when it is “actively preparing to make a 
decision.”178 The purpose of frontloading the review process is 
“so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to 
the decision making process and will not be used to rationalize 
or justify decisions already made.”179 Yet the bifurcated review 
process, wherein DOE participates as a “cooperating agency” 
during FERC’s environmental review of the LNG facilities but 
undertakes its own separate inquiry to approve the actual 
export of LNG, makes it difficult to imagine a situation where 
DOE would participate in the approval of upgrading the 
physical facilities necessary for exporting LNG but then deny 
applications to do so. It may be too much to ask for FERC and 
DOE to be objective regarding the merits of exporting LNG, 
but NEPA still requires these projects to be objectively 
evaluated.180 
CONCLUSION 
Challenges to the environmental reviews conducted by 
FERC and DOE in conjunction with proposals to export LNG 
have, so far, failed across the board. The result: no agency is 
required to disclose the upstream greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with approving LNG exports.181 This void is 
contrary to NEPA, which imposes on the federal government a 
continuing responsibility to ensure that decision-making 
occurs before a federal action leads to an irreparable 
environmental change. The D.C. Circuit has allowed FERC 
and DOE to upend these basic requirements by skirting NEPA 
procedures that require agencies to tailor their environmental 
                                                 
178. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (2017). 
179. Id. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5 (emphasis added). 
180. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000). 
181. Wentz, supra note 130, at 3–4. 
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reviews to include the indirect effects of a particular action and 
connected actions—and to do so jointly, in a unified review. 
But environmental advocates seeking to expand reviews by 
FERC and DOE need not give up hope. The D.C. Circuit’s 
recent jurisprudence offers some indication that the court may 
be divided on the question of how to draw the line around 
indirect effects. In order to breathe new life into NEPA and 
provide the public with necessary information about the 
domestic effects of promoting a substantial increase in LNG 
exports, environmental advocates could consider both re-
visiting the central holding of Public Citizen and traditional 
NEPA segmentation principles to bolster future claims. 
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